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GROUNDS FOR REHEARING
On December 31, 1992, this Court rendered its
decision1 in this case holding that, as a matter of law, a
seller under a standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement
is not entitled to rely on the stated terms of that contract.
Leucadia requests that the Court reconsider its decision on the
following grounds:
1.

The Court misapprehends fundamental principles of

law that should govern this decision with serious consequences
to all parties utilizing standard form real estate contracts.
2.

The Court misapprehends several key facts of this

case which distinguish it from the cases the Court relied on in
reaching its decision including (a) that the defect which
rendered title unmarketable was not a defect over which this
seller had any control, (b) the defect occurred not as a result
of any conduct or fault of the seller's, and (c) the defect
could not be cured by the paying of money.
As set forth more fully below, petitioner believes
reconsideration of these key facts and review of critical legal
precepts will allow this Court to render a decision that both
recognizes the general application of specific performance of a
buyer while at the same time adhering to fundamental and longstanding legal principles, including that parties to a contract
are entitled to rely on the express terms of that contract

1

See Appendix A.

without fear that a court, without notice, will rewrite
essential provisions.
BACKGROUND
On March 2, 1987, plaintiff William R. Kelley and
First Security Mortgage Company2 ("First Security") executed a
standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement by which First
Security agreed to sell residential property in Park City, Utah,
to Kelley.

Under the terms of the agreement, the seller was to

provide marketable title to buyer upon closing.

Paragraph G,

which is the provision dealing with title inspection, provides
that if there are defects in the title to which the buyer has
objected,
Seller shall be required through escrow at
closing to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer
has objected. If said defect(s) is not
curable through an escrow agreement at
closing, this Agreement shall be null and
void at the option of the Buyer and all
monies received herewith shall be returned
to the respective parties.
(R. 15.)

Similarly, Paragraph H, dealing with title insurance,

provides that "[i]f title cannot be made so insurable through an
escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless
Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded
to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated."
(R. 15.)
After the agreement was executed, the parties learned
that First Security could not convey marketable title to all of

2

Leucadia is asserting the rights of First Security in this appeal. (R. 844-46.)
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the property contemplated by the agreement due to an erroneous
survey.

(R. 143.)

The defect which rendered title unmarketable

was not a defect over which this seller had any control.

The

boundary dispute resulted from a prior erroneous survey and
previous conveyances of the property incorporating the
description from the erroneous survey.

(R. 81, 150.)

It was

not a defect which could be cured by the payment of money.
First Security took reasonable efforts to resolve this
dispute.

It attempted to resolve the problem through

negotiation (R. 357) and, when these efforts were unsuccessful,
it initiated an action against the adjacent landowners to
establish correct boundaries.

(R. 23-59.)

It soon became

apparent to First Security that the litigation with the adjacent
landowners would not be satisfied without the expenditure of
great time and expense. Moreover, First Security was aware that
it was impossible to predict the outcome of the litigation.

For

these reasons, First Security notified Kelley that it would go
forward with the action to resolve the boundary dispute if
Kelley would assist First Security in paying the costs of the
action.

(R. 114-15.)

Kelley was unwilling to do so; First

Security was unwilling to bear the risk and expense of the
litigation without such participation by Kelley.

(R. 114-15.)

At the time set for closing, First Security was still
unable to provide marketable title.

To determine its course of

conduct, First Security turned to the terms of the contract that
it believed governed the relationship between the parties.

-3-

Understanding that Kelley was unwilling to waive the defect in
title3 and viewing the contract language objectively, First
Security understood the mandatory language of paragraphs G and H
to require termination.
Kelley continued to insist that First Security acquire
title to the disputed property and convey it as contracted, and
filed this action to obtain the court's assistance in this
regard.

The trial court ordered First Security to convey the

property to Kelley.

First Security appealed.

The Utah Court of

Appeals held that Kelley's remedies under the agreement were to
waive any title defect and proceed with the closing or to
terminate the agreement and receive a refund of his earnest
money deposit.4

Slip Op. at 1.

The court of appeals

determined that Kelly refused to waive the defect and,
therefore, ordered held that Kelley's remedy was limited to a
refund of his earnest money deposit.

Slip Op. at 3.

The court

reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case
for entry of judgment consistent with the court's opinion.

Slip

Op. at 3.
This Court reviewed the court of appeal's decision on
writ of certiorari, reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The Court

concluded that pertinent provisions of the earnest money
3

In fact, Kelly insisted that First Security resolve the boundary dispute, clear title as provided for in
the contract, and convey the entire property described in the agreement. (R. 120.)
4

See Appendix B.
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agreement were written only for the advantage of the buyer and
could not be relied upon by a seller, despite the clear and
unqualified express terms of the contract.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Court's Decision Misapprehends General Rules of Contract
Construction and Established Utah Precedent.
Leucadia requests this Court to reexamine its holding

that, as a matter of law, a seller under a standard form Utah
Earnest Money Sales Agreement is not entitled to rely on the
stated terms of that contract.

This holding does not comport

with several well-established principles of Utah law.
Utah adheres to the objective theory of contract
interpretation.
"The basic rule of contract interpretation
is that the intent of the parties is to be
ascertained from the content of the
instrument itself.... Each contract
provision is to be considered in relation to
all of the others, with a view toward giving
effect to all and ignoring none." The plain
meaning rule preserves the intent of the
parties and protects the contract against
judicial revision.
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802
P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted).

See also Park

Valley Corp. v. Baqlev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981) ("[S]ellers
and buyers should be able to contract on their own terms without
the indulgence of paternalism by the courts in the alleviation
of one side or another from the effects of a poor bargain.");
Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah

-5-

Ct. App. 1990) (same); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332
P.2d 989, 990-91 (1958) (same); Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326
P.2d 712, 717 (1958) ("It is not [the court's] prerogative to
step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties.").
Several fundamental rules of contract construction
guide Utah courts in interpreting contracts.

For example, it is

axiomatic that where general and specific provisions in a
contract may relate to the same thing, the more specific
provision should control.

E.g., Corso v. Creighton University,

731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 203(c) at 93 (1981).

The rule in its most

restrictive form is that the specific provisions qualify the
meaning of the general provisions.
§ 367 at 387-88 (1991).

17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts

Corbin applies the rule more

sweepingly:
If the apparent inconsistency is between a
clause that is general and broadly inclusive
in character and one that is more limited
and specific in its coverage, the latter
should generally be held to operate as a
modification and pro tanto nullification of
the former.
3 Corbin on Contracts § 547 at 176 (1960).
Another rule universally adopted is that the word
"may" is permissive and "shall" is mandatory in private
contracts.

E.g., Professional Executive Ctr. v. LaSalle Nat'l

Bank, 570 N.E.2d 366, 373 (111. Ct. App. 1991); Leghorn v.
Wieland, 289 So.2d 745, 747 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
Dictionary defines the term "shall" as follows:
-6-

Black's Law

As used in statutes, contracts, or the like,
this word is generally imperative or
mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance,
and in its ordinary signification, the term
"shall" is a word of command, and one which
has always or which must be given a
compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation.
Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990).
The Court's holding in this case that the seller under
a standard form Utah Earnest Money Sales Agreement is not
entitled to rely on the stated terms of that contract is
inconsistent with these fundamental principles.

There is no

indication on the face of the contract that the seller is not
entitled to rely on the provisions found in paragraphs G and H.
Rather, the terms of the contract relating to the seller's
obligation to provide marketable title upon closing state in
clear, mandatory terms that where there are defects in title
that cannot be cured through an escrow at closing, the agreement
shall terminate, unless the buyer waives such defects or
encumbrances.
The language in paragraphs G and H could easily have
been drafted to provide a benefit to only one of the two
contracting parties.5 Had the parties intended to allow only

5

There is no doubt that the drafters of the standard form Earnest Money Agreement were capable of
drafting provisions applicable only to one of the parties to the contract. Paragraph N of the agreement
makes such a distinction. It provides:
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the
earnest money as liquidated damages or to institute suit to enforce any
rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, of if this sale fails to
close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition or
contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement...
the earnest money deposit shall be returned to Buyer.

-7-

the buyer to benefit from the provisions of Paragraph H, for
example, the drafters could have provided that "if title cannot
be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the
buyer may, at his option, (1) terminate the contract and receive
a return of the earnest money deposit; or (2) waive the defect
and proceed to closing; or (3) waive full performance and elect
to accept that title which the seller is able to convey with an
abatement in purchase price."

The drafters did not so provide.

Instead, they drafted a provision that appears on its face to
give protection to both buyers and sellers.

They drafted a

provision that appears on its face to require mandatory
termination in the event of a title deficiency that is not
curable through the payment of money at closing.6

Without

clear notice that a party to a contract is not entitled to rely
on a material provision of that contract, a court should not
rewrite the terms of the agreement for the benefit of one party
alone.7
6

There are only a limited number of circumstances where a title defect could not be cured through
closing, thereby allowing a seller to be relieved from the agreement. Where title defects can actually be
cured by the simple payment of money in escrow, e.g., to remove liens or encumbrances, the seller would
be required to perform as stated in the contract. Where, however, no amount of money would "cure" the
defect (such as in this case where no amount of money could guarantee that a court would find the
survey erred on the side of the Kelleys), the seller is entitled to receive the benefit of the stated
provisions of the contract providing for mandatory termination.
7

The Court's decision has serious implications for all parties utilizing the standard form earnest
money. Parties to a standard form earnest money, for example, will no longer be able to assume that the
rights and obligations expressed in the contract truly extend to both parties to the contract. They will be
left to speculate, on a provision by provision basis, whether the stated terms actually provided for the
rights and obligations indicated, or whether, without notice, they will learn that they should have drafted
a new contract because the protection the parties thought they were receiving were actually only for the
benefit of one party, but not both, despite the contract's stated terms.

-8-

The Court also looked to paragraph N, dealing with
attorney's fees, in determining that a seller cannot rely on the
specific language in paragraphs G and H.

Paragraph N provides

that if either party defaults in any of the terms of the
agreement, the defaulting party is responsible to pay all costs
and expenses, including attorney's fees, which may arise in
enforcing or terminating the agreement or pursuing any remedy
available in law.

Leucadia recognizes that there are many

remedies potentially available at law to parties to a real
estate contract, including specific performance under
appropriate circumstances.

However, Leucadia submits that this

general provision allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees
should not be a basis for modifying or replacing the very
specific provisions which were drafted to accommodate a very
specific set of circumstances such as those presented here.
II.

Paragraphs G and H Can Be Interpreted Consistent With the
Law of Specific Performance and at the Same Time Give the
Ordinary Meaning to the Contract Language.
The Court's decision expresses the concern that
to construe paragraphs G and H as barring a
buyer's right to specific performance would
allow a seller to breach the contract
without consequence, since the buyer's only
remedy would be to rescind the agreement.
Not only would a seller have no motivation
to clear title, but the cost of clearing
title would be shifted to a buyer determined
to purchase the property. Thus, Leucadia's
construction would place buyers in a
disadvantageous position relative to sellers
and deny them traditional remedies, such as
specific performance. The even-handed
protection that a uniform contract form
-9-

ought to give both parties would become, in
effect, illusory.
Decision at 6.

The position advocated by Leucadia, however,

actually works to provide "even-handed protection" to both
parties and give the full and ordinary meaning to all contract
provisions.

Indeed, the overwhelming majority of courts and

commentators have so recognized.
The generally recognized rule of law in this area is
summarized by Professor Milton R. Friedman:
Some contracts of sale provide that if
the seller is unable to deliver good title,
the seller will return all payments on
account of the purchase price (plus,
perhaps, the net cost of title examination
and of a survey, if any) and thereupon the
contract will become void. This provision
is included at the seller's instance to
avoid a possible liability for substantial
damages if title should prove defective. It
protects the seller against such liability
and bars the purchaser from specific
performance with an abatement in purchase
price where the seller acts in good faith.
The provision has also been held for the
benefit of the buyer, who may waive the
defect and entitle himself to the
conveyance, provided he so elects with
reasonable promptness. It does not permit
seller to take advantage of his own breach
where inability to perform is due to his own
fault or collusion. Neither does it require
a seller to buy an outstanding interest at a
substantial cost, in order to make his title
marketable. But whether or not seller must
subject himself to substantial expense to
clear his title in the absence of bad faith
depends upon the intentions of the parties.
Generally speaking, a vendee who seeks
specific performance may not compel his
vendor to clear his title by means of
litigation against a third party, on the
ground that the court cannot supervise a
lawsuit. But a vendor has been required to
clear his title by completing Torrens
-10-

proceedings and to conduct apparently simple
proceedings to have old mortgages properly
satisfied. A subvendor has been compelled
to exercise his right to purchase, against
the primary vendor in order to enable him to
perform under a subcontract.
The purpose of an exculpatory clause is
to protect a seller from a possible
liability for substantial damages if he
should be unable to convey title in
accordance with the contract. It should not
permit him to cancel a contract that no
longer seems attractive, particularly if the
purchaser is willing to waive the defect in
question. Nor should it excuse the seller
from making reasonable efforts at moderate
expense to put his title in order. It
should not excuse him generally from
satisfying some lien he has created, e.g., a
mortgage, or has suffered to occur, e.g.,
unpaid real estate taxes.
M. Friedman, Contracts and Conveyances of Real Property § 1.5 at
113-16 (3d ed. 1975) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
Courts universally follow this rule.

E.g., King v.

Knibb, 447 A.2d 1143 (R.I. 1982) (specific performance not
appropriate where title not marketable at closing through no
fault of seller, seller has not acted in bad faith, and seller
has not waived the protection of the termination clause); Hum v.
Pinner, 608 P.2d 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (if, after good faith
effort by the sellers, they are unable to perfect the title,
buyers must take the title with the defects or terminate); Lanna
v. Greene, 399 A.2d 837 (Conn. 1978) (parties' real estate
contract contractually eliminated vendee's right to specific
performance with an abatement in purchase price; real estate
contract like all other agreements must be considered as a whole
and each part of it must be given effect if possible); Robinson
-11-

v, Compton, 549 P.2d 274 (Idaho 1976) (parties' stipulation
eliminating specific performance and abatement as remedy for the
inability of vendor to provide merchantable title is binding in
the absence of bad faith and forecloses an action for a
different remedy).

C.f. Berry v. Nardozzi, 284 N.E.2d 250

(Mass. 1972); Sawl v. Kwiatkowski, 212 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1965).
The cases cited by this Court in its decision are not
to the contrary.

In Ace Realty, Inc. v. Looneyf 531 P.2d 1377,

1380 (Okla. 1974), the seller under a real estate contract
sought to terminate the contract on grounds that it could not
correct a title defect within the time prescribed in the
contract.

The buyer, however, was prepared to waive the defect

and accept at closing the title which the seller was able to
convey.

Under these circumstances, the court found that the

seller could not terminate the contract but was required to
convey that title which it had.

The court noted, however, that

"[i]f the seller is truly unable to satisfy a title defect, and
the purchaser refuses to waive satisfaction, then the seller is
entitled to claim frustration of the contract and avoid specific
performance."

531 P.2d at 1380.

The Court also cites, Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024
(Wyo. 1976), for the proposition that "sellers of real property
cannot terminate an earnest money agreement under a provision
permitting the buyers to demand a refund of their earnest money
when the sellers had breached the contract."

-12-

While certainly

correct as stated, the facts of that case (and thus its holding)
are really inapposite here.
The sellers in Reed refused to prepare the final
papers to close the sale, an act entirely within their control,
and sought thereby to avoid the contract.
here.

Such is not the case

First Security did not by its own conduct create a

situation to render title unmarketable and then seek to avoid
the contract.

The title defect facing First Security was

entirely out of its control; no amount of money could have cured
the defect. Moreover, First Security was not anxious to
terminate the contract.

In fact, it was willing to go forward

with the closing provided that the buyer acted in accordance
with the terms of the contract and waive the title defects.
The interpretation of paragraphs G and H urged by
Leucadia does not allow a seller to breach the contract without
consequence.

In fact, it expressly recognizes that if the

seller acts in bad faith and encumbers title to avoid closing,
or is at fault in any way for the title defect, the buyer would
be entitled to specific performance of the contract.8 However,
where, as here, the seller has made a good faith effort to clear
title and still is unable to

do so, the seller should not be

exposed to unlimited liability to perform.

8

Rather, the Court

This situation is also covered by the express terms of paragraphs G and H which makes an
exception where the title defect can be "cured through escrow at closing." Virtually any defect which the
seller intentionally created, e j ^ a lien or encumbrance, could be cured by the payment of money. See
supra note 6.
-13-

should acknowledge that it is precisely this risk that the
parties bargained away.
CONCLUSION
Clearly foreseen by the drafters of the uniform
contract is the contingency that the seller may be unable to
cure defects in title through the payment of money at closing.
In that event, paragraphs G and H, in language that is
unambiguous and of ordinary meaning, stipulated that the
purchaser shall at its election choose between two options.
This language is mandatory and places the burden on the
purchaser to decide at the closing in which of the two
designated ways the transaction is then to be brought to an end;
either by accepting such title as the seller can convey (but
without any abatement in price for title deficiencies), or by
rescinding the contract and obtaining a refund of the down
payment.

While, of course, if the seller refuses to convey or

refund, or deliberately creates a defect in title, the buyer
could seek recourse in law or equity, this is not such a case.
The difficulty in this case arose when First Security,
for reasons entirely beyond its control, found it was unable to
provide the title for which the agreement called.

Kelley then

refused to choose either of the options to which he expressly
had been limited in these circumstances.

Instead, Kelley sought

conveyance of either clear title, which First Security was not
then in a position to deliver, or such lesser title as First
Security did have power to convey, but with an unbargained
-14-

abatement in the purchase price.

By requesting remedies which

were contractually excluded, Kelley was, in effect, asking the
court to redraft the parties' contract of sale.

It is

fundamental that equity enforces contracts; it does not rewrite
them.
Leucadia requests the Court to reconsider its
interpretation of this standard form contract and affirm the
decision of the court of appeals.
DATED this

day of January, 1993.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

^John A. Snow
Kathryn H. Snedaker
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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D. Frank Wilkins
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David W. Lund
Assistant Attorney General
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130 Utah State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Tab A

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

William R. Kelley, Jr.,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

No. 900187
F I L E D
December 31, 1992

v.
Leucadia Financial Corporation,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

David R. Olsen, Charles P. Sampson, Paul M. Simmons,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
John A. Snow, Kathryn H. Snedaker, Salt Lake City,
for Leucadia Financial Corp.
R. Paul Van Dam, David W. Lund, Salt Lake City, for
Department of Commerce
D. Frank Wilkins, Salt Lake City, David W. Johnson,
Park City, for amicus Utah Association of Realtors

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
STEWART, Justice:
This case presents the issue of whether a buyer of real
estate can obtain specific performance of a standard Utah Earnest
Money Sales Agreement against a defaulting seller.
First Security Bank (FSB) agreed to sell real property
to William R. Kelley pursuant to a standard Earnest Money Sales
Agreement.1 FSB could not provide marketable and insurable title
because of a boundary dispute. Kelley filed an action for a
declaratory judgment and for specific performance of the
agreement. The trial court entered an order directing FSB to
convey the property to Kelley.

1

On appeal, Leucadia has been substituted for FSB as
defendant.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
in an unpublished opinion that the terms of the standard Earnest
Money Sales Agreement preclude a buyer from obtaining specific
performance against a breaching seller. The court held that when
a seller fails to provide a marketable and insurable title, the
standard agreement limits the buyer to one of two remedies:
(1) enforcement of the agreement, but only after the buyer
tenders full payment of the contract price; or (2) rescission of
the contract with a refund of the earnest money. We granted
certiorari because of the potential effect of that ruling on real
estate transactions using the standard Utah Earnest Money Sales
Agreement.
On March 2, 1987, Kelley and FSB executed an earnest
money sales agreement by which FSB agreed to sell residential
property in Park City, Utah, to Kelley. Kelley paid $10,000 in
earnest money to FSB and began liquidating some of his assets to
obtain the balance due. The closing was set for April 20, 1987.
The agreement, written on a standard form, included the
following general provisions: (1) The seller would furnish good
and marketable title, subject to encumbrances and exceptions
provided in the contract, "evidenced by a current policy of title
insurance"; (2) if title insurance was unobtainable due to title
defects, the buyer could elect to waive the defects or to
terminate the agreement and have the earnest money refunded; and
(3) time was of the essence. The seller added a handwritten
provision stating that the property was sold , M as is,' without
warranty. Title conveyed by special warranty deed."
FSB acquired the property by quitclaim deed from the
former owners, who had defaulted on loans secured by the
property. The property, consisting of approximately thirteen
acres, included a residence, a stream, and a spring. The stream
fed a trout pond located in front of the house and provided
irrigation water for the property.
After execution of the agreement, a survey revealed
that FSB's quitclaim deed contained an erroneous property
description, which misplaced a boundary line by 15.22 feet,
thereby excluding the stream and spring. In an attempt to cure
the defect, FSB asked the adjoining property owners, the
Armstrongs, to convey the disputed property. The Armstrongs
refused and cut off the water to the pond, causing it to dry up.
On April 22, 1987, two days after the specified closing
date, FSB and Kelley agreed to extend the date to June 1, 1987,
so that FSB could clear up the boundary problem. Thereafter, the
parties agreed to extend the closing date to July 1, 1987, and
then to August 31, 1987.

No. 900187

2

In July 1987, FSB filed a complaint against the
Armstrongs to quiet title to the disputed portion of the property
and to recover damages caused by vandalism, FSB informed Kelley
that he need not retain an attorney because the bank would handle
the litigation.
On September 4, 1987, four days after the last agreed
upon closing date, FSB's attorney sent a letter to Kelley,
demanding that he close the transaction by September 15, 1987.
The letter stated that FSB would consider the agreement
terminated if the closing were not consummated by the 15th and
that FSB was ready and able to sell the property " x as is 7 without
warranty in accordance with the terms of the earnest money
agreement." FSB also stated that it would not proceed with the
Armstrong litigation and that it had only pursued the lawsuit
because it was interested in closing the deal with Kelley and not
because it had a legal obligation to deliver clear title. FSB
offered to assign its rights in the Armstrong litigation to
Kelley and recommended that Kelley obtain counsel. FSB also
offered to refund Kelley's earnest money should he choose to
"walk away from the deal."
Kelley, who was then living in Massachusetts, did not
receive the letter until September 8, 1987. He immediately
replied by telegram to FSB, stating that he would not abandon the
deal. Kelley then retained counsel, who contacted FSB and
requested copies of all documents relating to the boundary
litigation. Kelley's counsel asked for a thirty-day extension of
the closing date so that Kelley could evaluate the litigation and
its effect on the value of the property. FSB agreed to extend
the closing date only one week, to September 22, but stated that
it would cooperate fully with respect to the litigation.
Kelley's attorney, however, did not receive the necessary
documents from FSB's attorney until October 15, 1987.
Nevertheless, on September 22, 1987, Kelley's attorney wrote to
FSB and tendered Kelley's performance. The letter stated that
Kelley was ready, willing, and able to close and that the
necessary funds had been transferred to Williamsburg Savings Bank
in Salt Lake City to be paid at closing. The letter also stated
that the "tender is conditioned only upon First Security honoring
its obligations pursuant to the earnest money sales agreement and
delivering the property free from those defects which it has
undertaken to cure." On the same day, Kelley filed a complaint
against FSB for a declaratory judgment, damages for breach of
contract, and specific performance. Kelley's funds were
subsequently deposited with the Summit County clerk.
On September 24, 1987, FSB executed a release of
Kelley's $10,000 earnest money deposit, but Kelley refused to
accept it. The next day, Leucadia Financial Corporation formally
offered to purchase the property from FSB, and on November 2,
1987, Leucadia and FSB entered into an earnest money sales
agreement. Leucadia purchased the property on November 25, 1987.
3
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FSB moved to dismiss Kelley's complaint on the grounds
that Kelley's tender was defective
and specific performance was
not a remedy available under the agreement. Kelley countered
with a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that he was
entitled to specific performance and an abatement in the purchase
price. The court denied FSB's motion to dismiss and granted
Kelley's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that Kelley
was entitled to specific performance. The court reserved for
trial Kelley's claim for damages and an abatement in the purchase
price. Kelley and FSB subsequently settled the abatement and
damages issues, and the trial court entered a decree of specific
performance directing FSB to convey the undisputed portion of the
property by special warranty deed and the disputed portion by
quitclaim deed.
The parties stipulated to substitute Leucadia for FSB
and Leucadia appealed to this Court. Pursuant to Rule 42 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we transferred the case to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals held that Kelley was not
entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance because
Kelley's remedies were limited by paragraphs G and H of the
agreement. Given that ruling, the court of appeals did not
decide whether Kelley's tender was legally sufficient.
I. A BUYER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
UNDER THE STANDARD EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
The terms of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement
have been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the
Attorney General. With some exceptions not relevant here, real
estate agents may fill out only those forms approved by the Utah
Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General. Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2-20 (1989)• According to the Utah Association of Realtors,
which appeared as amicus curiae, the standard form Earnest Money
Sales Agreement is used in the majority of real estate
transactions conducted by its members.
Paragraphs G and H, which deal with title inspection
and title insurance, were construed by the court of appeals to
provide a buyer's exclusive remedies against a breaching seller.
Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp*, No. 880534-CA, slip op. at 3
(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1990). Paragraph G provides that if there
are defects in the title that the seller does not cure, the buyer
may declare the agreement null and have all monies returned. The
last sentence of paragraph G states:
If said defect(s) is not curable through an
escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement
shall be null and void at the option of the
Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall
be returned to the respective parties.

M ^
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The court of appeals held that because Kelley had not declared
the agreement null and void under paragraph G, his remedies were
limited to those stated in paragraph H.
Paragraph H deals with title insurance and confers on
the buyer a right to nonjudicial rescission if the agreed-upon
title insurance is not provided. Paragraph H provides:
If title insurance is elected, Seller
authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a
preliminary commitment for a standard form
ALTA policy of title insurance to be issued
by such title insurance company as Seller
shall designate. Title policy to be issued
shall contain no exceptions other than those
provided for in said standard form, and the
encumbrances or defects excepted under the
final contract of sale. If title cannot be
made so insurable through an escrow agreement
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless
Buyer elects to waive such defects or
encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated.
(Emphasis added.) The court of appeals held that paragraph H
allows a buyer either to (1) waive the title defect and pay the
full purchase price or (2) rescind the agreement and receive a
refund of his earnest money. Under that construction, Kelley's
refusal to waive the title defects caused the agreement to
terminate by its own terms.
Leucadia argues that Kelley is limited to the remedies
set forth in paragraphs G and H. That position is untenable.
Paragraphs G and H do not purport to be exclusive remedies, nor
do they in any way limit the traditional common law or equitable
remedies available to a buyer. Rather, these provisions are
designed to give buyers the right to walk away from the contract
and obtain a refund of their earnest money without having to
obtain judicial redress. Thus, the remedies set out in
paragraphs G and H are for the sole benefit of the buyer.
A seller is not entitled to take advantage of a
provision intended to benefit the buyer alone. E.g., Ace Realty,
Inc. v. Loonev. 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975). Ace Realty
construed a provision of an earnest money sales agreement similar
to paragraph H. The court stated, "The contractual provision
that title is to be good and merchantable or the contract will be
void and the earnest money returned is for the benefit of the
purchaser, rather than the seller." Id. The court then held
that a seller could not avoid its contractual obligations under a
provision clearly for the benefit of the buyer. Id. at 1381.
Similarly, the court in Reed v. Wadsworth, 553 P.2d 1024, 1034
(Wyo. 1976), held that the sellers of real property could not
5
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terminate an earnest money agreement under a provision permitting
the buyers to demand a refund of their earnest money when the
sellers had breached the contract. Accordingly, paragraphs G and
H give the buyer the absolute right to rescind the agreement if
the seller defaults, but they do not confer on a defaulting
seller the right to compel the buyer to either terminate the
agreement or pay full value notwithstanding the seller's
defective performance.
Moreover, to construe paragraphs G and H as barring a
buyer's right to specific performance would allow a seller to
breach the contract without consequence, since the buyer's only
remedy would be to rescind the agreement. Not only would a
seller have no motivation to clear title, but the cost of
clearing title would be shifted to a buyer determined to purchase
the property. Thus, Leucadia's construction would place buyers
in a disadvantageous position relative to sellers and deny them
traditional remedies, such as specific performance. The evenhanded protection that a uniform contract form ought to give both
parties would become, in effect, illusory.
Leucadia's position that paragraphs G and H provide
exclusive remedies is also inconsistent with paragraph N, which
makes clear that those provisions were not intended to be a
buyer's sole remedy. Paragraph N deals generally with the
remedies available in the event of a default by either the buyer
or the seller. It states:
In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may
elect to either retain the earnest money as
liquidated damages or to institute suit to
enforce any rights of Seller. In the event
of default by Seller, or if this sale fails
to close because of the nonsatisfaction of
any express condition or contingency to which
the sale is subject pursuant to this
Agreement (other than by virtue of any
default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit
shall be returned to Buyer. Both parties
agree that should either party default in any
of the covenants or agreements herein
contained, the defaulting party shall pay all
costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement,
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder
or by applicable law, whether such remedy is
pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph N clearly contemplates that both
buyers and sellers may pursue "any remedy provided hereunder or
by applicable law." The language "any remedy . . . under
applicable law" means all applicable statutory, common law, and
No. 900187
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equitable remedies. Specific performance with an abatement in
the purchase price has long been recognized as an appropriate
remedy when a seller refuses to convey. Castagno v. Church. 552
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1975).
Buyers and sellers are, of course, at liberty to modify
a standard agreement and negotiate terms that limit or expand the
remedies of one or both parties. There is no evidence here,
however, to suggest that the parties intended to limit Kelley's
remedies to preclude specific performance.
II.

TENDER

We now turn to the issue of whether Kelley made a
timely and unconditional tender of his performance to FSB. The
trial court found that Kelley made an unconditional tender. The
court of appeals, however, did not address the issue because it
held that paragraphs G and H controlled Kelley's remedies. The
parties have briefed this issue, and we address it in the
interest of judicial expediency.
To obtain a decree for specific performance against a
defaulting party, the aggrieved party must make an unconditional
tender of the performance required by the agreement. Century 21
All Western Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56
(Utah 1982); see also Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Inc., 622
P.2d 808, 811 (Utah 1981); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). Neither party to an agreement "can
be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for
damages or a decree for specific performance) until the other
party has tendered his own performance." Century 21, 645 P.2d at
56. In other words, "a party must make a tender of his own
agreed performance in order to put the other party in default."
Id. ; see also Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45, 46-47 (Utah 1974).
The tender cannot impose on the other party a new
condition or requirement not already imposed by the contract.
Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56; accord 5A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 1233 (1964) [hereinafter "Corbin"]. If the law were
otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other party to
comply with new contractual terms. Accordingly, a tender, as a
general rule, must be unconditional. A tender that contains an
improper condition or requirement disqualifies a party from
obtaining a decree of specific performance. Baxter, 622 P.2d at
811; Century 21, 645 P.2d at 56. A party to a bilateral contract
may, however, properly condition a tender on the others
performance, since such a condition does not impose a requirement
beyond that already contained in the contract. 5A Corbin § 1233.
Leucadia argues that Kelley's tender was defective
because Kelley 7 s demand for a title free from the boundary defect
7
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was a new condition not contained in the agreement, Kelley
responds that his demand did not impose a new condition on FSB,
but insisted only that FSB do that which it had promised to do in
the agreement and had, in fact, undertaken to do by filing the
lawsuit against the Armstrongs.
Whether Kelley's demand that FSB cure the title defect
constituted a conditional tender depends on whether the agreement
already obligated FSB to do so. Paragraph 3 of the agreement
states that the seller "agrees to furnish good and marketable
title to the property, subject to encumbrances and exceptions
noted herein." The primary obligation of a seller under an
earnest money sales agreement is to provide marketable title.
Marketable title is one that may be "freely made the subject of
resale" and that can be sold at a "fair price to a reasonable
purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as
security for the loan of money." 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and
Purchaser § 131, at 313-14 (1975). Generally, when a seller
agrees to convey marketable title, the seller must undertake to
cure defects if it can be done in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and within a reasonable time. See, e.g., Ace Realty,
Inc. v. Looney, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975).
The boundary dispute with the Armstrongs constituted a
cloud on the title and adversely affected the value and
marketability of the property, a fact FSB admitted in its
complaint against the Armstrongs. FSB argued to the trial court
that the , M as is / without warranty" language in the handwritten
notation referred to warranties of title and therefore released
FSB from any obligation to resolve the boundary dispute. That
argument is not valid. In the same notation, FSB agreed to
convey the property to Kelley by special warranty deed. A
special warranty deed, although not as broad as a general
warranty deed, carries with it certain warranties of title.
Therefore, the "as is" language did not modify FSB's express
promise to convey marketable title.
FSB's own conduct and statements support this
conclusion. FSB acknowledged its obligation to provide clear
title when it undertook the Armstrong litigation and told Kelley
that he need not retain an attorney. For a period of four
months, FSB, by its actions and statements, led Kelley to believe
that FSB would resolve the boundary problem and deliver clear and
marketable title, as it was obligated to do under the contract.
Not until its letter of September 4 did FSB disclaim any
obligation to do what it had previously acknowledged. It was
only then, and for the first time, that FSB stated that it had
undertaken the litigation, not because it was obligated to, but
because of FSB's interest in closing the deal with Kelley.
In view of FSB's express promise to provide clear and
marketable title and its having undertaken litigation to do so,
we hold that Kelley's tender did not impose a new condition, but
o n n i Q*7
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was merely a request that FSB do what it was contractually
obligated to do.
III.

TIMELINESS

Finally, Leucadia argues that Kelley cannot seek
specific performance because time was of the essence and Kelley
failed to tender his performance by the closing date. Because
the closing date had been extended several times by mutual
agreement, Kelley properly tendered his performance on
September 22, the last agreed upon closing date. We therefore
reject FSB's argument.
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and
the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Regnal W. Garff, Jr., Court
of Appeals Judge

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:

(Concurring)

I concur but write to point out an inconsistency
between paragraph G and paragraph H of the agreement. The last
sentence of paragraph G provides that if a defect in title is not
curable through an escrow at closing, the agreement shall be null
and void at the option of the buyer. The last sentence of
paragraph H states that if title cannot be made insurable through
an escrow at closing, the agreement shall be terminated unless
the buyer elects to waive the defects or encumbrances. While
paragraph G speaks of a "defect in title" and paragraph H deals
with a "title that cannot be made so insurable," I believe that
they both address the same thing. Yet in paragraph G,
termination is at the option of the buyer, whereas in
paragraph H, termination appears to be mandatory unless the buyer
elects to waive the defects. It was here that the court of
appeals was misled. It construed paragraph H literally instead
9
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of in light of paragraph G. Justice Stewart has properly
reconciled the two paragraphs by holding that termination is
intended to be at the option of the buyer.
I think the court of appeals also erred in that it did
not consider whether the defect in title here could be cured
through an escrow at closing as provided for in both paragraphs G
and H. From all that appears in the record before us, a
stipulated amount could have been withheld from the purchase
price at closing and escrowed pending resolution of the boundary
dispute.

Zimmerman, Justice, having disqualified himself, does
not participate herein; Garff, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.
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JACKSON, Judge:
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)1 appeals a
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley's damages as an
issue to be tried, but the parties settled that issue out of
court prior to the appeal. We reverse.
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties9
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not
marketable.
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the
interest of the original seller, First Security Mortgage
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the
seller.

The property contemplated by the parties in their sales
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadia's property
description did not include certain acreage containing a
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the
adjoining property owner. Thereafter, Leucadia initiated
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to
flow from their contract.
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects
or to return Kelley's earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously,
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the
parties' rights under the terms of the contract, and (2)
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as
declared.
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not
convey clear and marketable title to all the property.
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties'
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular
weight and review the determination under a correctness
standard. fi££ Kimball V, Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a
question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293
(Utah 1983). We find, BS r natter of law, no ambiguity in the
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable.
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v.
EAlLftn, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive.
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co.. 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document

itself. Bio Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv
Corp., 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), Thus, we turn
to the terms to which these parties agreed.
Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing,
including how the parties would deal with any title defect trial
appeared: "If said defect is not curable through an escrow
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance)
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title:
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed, was
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific
performance.
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties,
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are roeritless or
that they do not require our consideration in light of the
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties' agreement.3

2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender,
Where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder. 121 Utah Adv.

Rep. 16 (Ct. App. 1989), ai . Carr v. Enoch Smith Co.. 119 Utah
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989).fififialso Utah Code Ann.
S 78-27-1 (1987).
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining
landowner, which diverted the water and dried up the pond.
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties9 agreement provided a
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior
to closing
Kelley did not seek to use that procedure.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

Nortnan H. Jacksoiv^'Judge

I CONCUR:

,/0 .

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

BENCH, Judge (dissenting):
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe
the remedy of specific performance is available.
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties'
remedies at law to the terms of the contract. If there was a
•defect" in Leucadia's title, the contract permits Kelley to:
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2)
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream,
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no
•defect- in Leucadia1 s titK.fiftfiBlack's Law Dictionary 1332
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title).
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy,
the trial court could order specific performance of the
contract.
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. Sfi£ generally
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). "The rule

has been long established that a vendee has the right to insist
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the
value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno v. Church, 552
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976);fififiAlfifi In re Havhurst's Estate.
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White. 26 Wash. App.
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980).
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by
the parties.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

fienc^ii rn

